Note: see Toynbee, in his essay on Islam and in his Study of History, on the future strife for western civilzation, i.e., vis-a-vis Islam and the internal and external 'proliteriat' (in his sense of that world).
Note: also, Spengler's The Hour of Decision has some cogent remarks on the history of conflict amongst the European nations, especially in the 19th century.
Note: see also Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Colour Against White World Supremacy (1920).
Note: see also Fukuyama's The End of History.
Note: also, Spengler's The Hour of Decision has some cogent remarks on the history of conflict amongst the European nations, especially in the 19th century.
Note: see also Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Colour Against White World Supremacy (1920).
Note: see also Fukuyama's The End of History.
[Incomplete]
The Next Pattern of Conlict.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world [post Cold War] will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. National states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
Conflicts between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia [1648], the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes... . IN the process they created nation states, and beginning with the Frence Revolutoin the principle lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R.R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of whcih defined its identity in terms of ideology.
These conflicts bewteen princes, nations states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. [...] With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centrepiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.
Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion. [...] These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.
Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between people of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences bewteen civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. [...] The interactions among peoples of different civilizatoins enchance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.
Third, the process of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are seperating people from longstanding local identities.
Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations.
As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. [...]
The Next Pattern of Conlict.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world [post Cold War] will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. National states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
Conflicts between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia [1648], the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes... . IN the process they created nation states, and beginning with the Frence Revolutoin the principle lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R.R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of whcih defined its identity in terms of ideology.
These conflicts bewteen princes, nations states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. [...] With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centrepiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.
Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion. [...] These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.
Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between people of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences bewteen civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. [...] The interactions among peoples of different civilizatoins enchance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.
Third, the process of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are seperating people from longstanding local identities.
Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations.
As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. [...]
maybe fill in some gap here...
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.
After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became mone-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occured between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950's; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle East governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seixed Western hotages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its 'southern tier.'
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humilated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occured. The principle beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In ther Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.
After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became mone-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occured between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950's; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle East governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seixed Western hotages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its 'southern tier.'
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humilated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occured. The principle beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In ther Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.
On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's 'next confrontation,' observes M.J Akbar, an Indian Muslim Author, 'is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.' Bernard Lewis comes to a similiar conclusion:
'We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations - the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide expansion of both' [Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage,' The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 60; Time, June 15, 1992, pp. 24-28]
